Financial systems shape economic opportunities through direct and indirect channels. For example, the degree to which …nancial systems ameliorate information and transactions costs in ‡uences the nature of credit rationing, the cost of raising capital, and hence the barriers to starting or expanding businesses. Furthermore, more e¢ cient …-nancial systems can lower entry barriers in non…nancial industries, fostering the entry of new more e¢ cient …rms with potentially large e¤ects on the demand for labor and the competitiveness of labor markets. For example, Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010) show that more e¢ cient …nancial systems reduce unemployment and income inequality among salaried workers in non…nancial industries. Thus, by a¤ecting the entry of new …rms and labor market conditions, …nance can shape the economic opportunities available to individuals-even people who never receive a loan or issue a security.
In this paper, we contribute to research on how …nance shapes economic opportunities by evaluating the impact of a deregulation-induced improvement in the U.S. banking system on racial inequality. Research documents that black workers earn less than their white counterparts after controlling for di¤erences in education and experience. Yet, researchers have neither determined the degree to which this racial wage gap re ‡ects di¤erences in unobserved skills or racial discrimination, whereby blacks are paid less than identically productive whites, nor have researchers examined the role of …nancial sector policies in in ‡uencing racial wage inequality. We provide the …rst assessment of how the …nancial system a¤ects the racial wage gap; and, in conducting this assessment we provide novel evidence on the role of racial discrimination in in ‡uencing blacks'relative wages.
Our research strategy is structured by Becker's (1957) seminal theory of racial discrimination, which holds that (1) taste-based discrimination, the disutility that white employers attach to hiring black workers, can produce an enduring racial wage gap and (2) lowering barriers that impede the entry of new …rms can reduce this racial wage gap between identically productive workers. Becker argues that with lower entry barriers, …rms with less of a taste for discrimination can enter the market and initiate pro…table operations by hiring equally productive black workers at lower wage rates than their white counterparts, boosting the relative demand for black workers and reducing the racial wage gap. Becker did not argue that new …rms would reduce racial prejudices. Rather, he argued that lower entry barriers would erode the manifestation of racial prejudices on labor market outcomes. Accordingly, Becker's (1957) model predicts that lower entry barriers will reduce the racial wage gap but only if racial prejudices had been contributing to the black-white wage di¤erential. If racial attitudes were not depressing blacks'relative wages, then reducing entry barriers will not reduce the manifestation of those prejudices on the racial wage gap within the context of Becker's taste-based theory of discrimination.
Thus, to assess the impact of …nance on racial inequality, we build both on research in …nance and labor economics. From …nance, Black and Strahan (2002) , Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) , Kerr and Nanda (2009) , show that policy-induced improvements in the U.S. banking system lowered entry barriers in non…nancial industries and intensi…ed product market competition. From labor, Becker (1957) argues that intensi…ed product market competition will reduce the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor markets. We test whether regulatory-induced improvements in banking system e¢ ciency reduced the racial wage gap by intensifying product market competition in a manner consistent with Becker's (1957) taste-based theory of discrimination.
Speci…cally, we use interstate and intrastate bank deregulation across the U.S. states to identify an exogenous lowering of entry barriers impeding the entry of non…nancial …rms, and evaluate the impact on the racial wage gap while di¤erentiating among U.S. state economies with stronger and weaker racial prejudices. From the mid-1970s to 1994, individual states relaxed restrictions on the entry of banks from other states and the branching of banks within states, boosting bank competition, e¢ ciency, and the e¤ectiveness of credit allocation (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Hubbard and Palia, 1995) . These improvements in the banking industry lowered barriers to the entry of new …rms throughout the economy (Black and Strahan, 2002 ; Kerr and Nanda, 2009), spurring competition in non…nancial industries. Thus, we evaluate whether bank deregulation reduced a state's overall racial wage gap by spurring the entry of new …rms (new incorporations), which is the key mechanism suggested by the tastebased theory of discrimination.
To assess whether bank deregulation reduced racial inequality by reducing the impact of racial prejudices on labor markets, we use several state-speci…c measures of racial attitudes. First, from the 1970 U.S. census, we compute the predicted rate of racial intermarriage based on individual and state characteristics. We interpret the di¤erence between the predicted rate of intermarriage and the actual rate as positively related to the taste for discrimination. Although imperfect, this racial bias index captures decisions made far before our sample period since the 1970 census contains the accumulated stock of marriages in 1970 and we begin our analyses in 1976. Furthermore, we con…rm the results using survey-based measures of racial attitudes from Charles and Guryan (2008) . 1 We …nd that bank deregulation that intensi…ed product market competition substantially reduced racial wage discrimination by ameliorating the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor markets. We …rst …nd that bank deregulation increased the rate of new incorporations across states with di¤erent values of the racial bias index. Dynamically, the impact of deregulation on the rate of new incorporations grows over time. Second, bank deregulation increased blacks'relative wage rates, but only in "high racial bias" states. In states with above the median level of the racial bias index, deregulation eliminated about one-third of the initial racial wage gap after …ve years. Furthermore, the dynamic impact of deregulation on blacks'relative wages mirrors that of deregulation on new incorporations, with blacks'relative wages rising for many years following bank deregulation. Third, blacks' relative wages are positively associated with the rate of new incorporations in high racial bias states. Thus, while bank deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations in both high and low racial bias, there is a positive association between blacks' relative wages and both bank deregulation and new incorporations only in high racial bias states.
Moreover, the two-stage least squares results indicate that an exogenous lowering of entry barriers triggered by bank deregulation only boosted blacks'relative wages in states with a su¢ ciently high taste for discrimination. Using inter-and intrastate bank deregulation as instrumental variables to identify exogenous shocks to the rate of new incorporations, we …nd that increases in the rate of new incorporations only reduced the racial wage gap in high racial bias states, such that a ten percent increase in the rate of new incorporations reduced the black-white wage di¤erential by 2.5 percent.
The results are robust to several potentially confounding in ‡uences. First, one might be concerned that these results simply re ‡ect the observation that bank deregulation exerted a disproportionately positive e¤ect on the poor (Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010 ) and the poor are disproportionately black. But, three observations suggest that this is not the case: (a) bank deregulation increased blacks' relative wages only in high racial bias states, but there is not evidence the income inequality fell more in high racial biase states, (b) the results hold when conditioning on occupation, suggesting that blacks' relative wage rose in higher-and lower-income jobs, and (c) blacks'relative wages rose across the full distribution of relative wage rates. Second, deregulation could have shifted blacks into higher paying occupations and industries rather than boosting blacks' relative wages. Or, deregulation might have disproportionately boosted wage rates with a comparatively high proportion of black workers, not by reducing the manifestation of racial prejudices. But, we …nd that deregulation boosted blacks'wages relative to white workers in the same industry and occupation. Third, bank deregulation could have reduced labor force participation by low ability black workers and thereby boosted observed relative wage rates. However, we …nd that bank deregulation increased the relative working hours of black workers in high racial bias states, consistent with the interpretation that intensi…ed competition boosted the relative demand for black workers. Fourth, bank deregulation could trigger changes in the skill composition of the labor force through the selection of workers into the labor force, interstate migration, and changes in self-employment (Butler and Heckman, 1977; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008) . We …nd no evidence that bank deregulation substantively a¤ected the relative skill composition of black workers. Fifth, bank deregulation could have changed the prices of unobserved skills in which average black and white workers are di¤erentially endowed. Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991), however, we …nd that bank deregulation improved black workers'location throughout white workers'residual wage distribution, indicating that competition boosted blacks' relative wages in particular, not the relative wages of comparatively low income workers in general. Sixth, there might be concerns that states with a high degree of racial bias converge toward low racial bias states, or that blacks'relative wages increase over time, or that business cycles somehow account for the …ndings. But, the results hold after accounting for state and year …xed e¤ects, which control for all time-varying national in ‡uences, as well as state-speci…c factors.
Our major contribution is showing that exogenous improvements in the functioning of banks substantively enhanced the economic opportunities of an historically disadvantaged group. Financial deregulation reduced racial inequality by diminishing the impact of racial prejudices on labor market opportunities. We also contribute to a large literature on racial discrimination. 2 We provide the …rst evaluation of whether 2 We are obviously not the …rst to examine competition and discrimination. Becker (1957) , Shepard and Levin (1973) , and Oster (1975) compare market concentration and relative wage rates across industries, obtaining mixed results. Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) …nd a negative association between market concentration and the share of female employees across several banking markets in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Heywood and Peoples (1994) and Peoples and Talley (2001) …nd that the deregulation of trucking increased the relative wage rates of black workers. Black and Strahan the impact of an exogenous lowering of entry barriers facing non…nancial …rms on blacks' relative wages varies positively with the economy's taste for discrimination. That is, we not only assess whether lowering entry barriers increases blacks'relative wages in general, we examine whether it increases blacks'relative wages only in those environments in which the taste-based theory of discrimination suggests that competition will enhance blacks'labor market opportunities. Our results are fully consistent with the central implication of the taste-based theory of discrimination: lowering entry barriers so that new …rms can contest and compete with existing …rms diminishes the manifestation of racial prejudices on labor markets.
1 Bank Deregulation and New Firm Entry
Bank Branch Deregulation
The history of geographic restrictions on banking-along with standard econometric evidence-supports a key requirement of our estimation strategy: Namely, that bank deregulation is exogenous to competition and blacks'labor market outcomes. As described by White (1982) , geographic restrictions on banking protected local banks from competition for much of the 20 th century. By protecting ine¢ cient banks, geographic restrictions created a powerful constituency for maintaining these regulations.
In the last quarter of the 20 th century, however, technological, legal, and …nancial innovations diminished the economic and political power of banks bene…ting from geographic restrictions. In particular, a series of innovations lowered the costs of using distant banks. This reduced the monopoly power of local banks and weakened their ability and desire to lobby for geographic restrictions. For example, the invention of automatic teller machines (ATMs), in conjunction with court rulings that ATMs are not bank branches, weakened the geographical link between banks and their clientele. Furthermore, the creation of checkable money market mutual funds made banking by mail and telephone easier, thus further weakening the power of local bank monopolies. Finally, the increasing sophistication of credit scoring techniques, improvements in information processing, and the revolution in telecommunications reduced the informational advantages of local bankers, especially with regards to small and new …rms. These national developments interacted with preexisting state characteristics to (2001) …nd that bank deregulation increased competition between banks, disproportionately reducing the rents paid to male workers relative to female bank employees. Within manufacturing, Black and Brainerd (2004) …nd that globalization intensi…ed competition and thereby reduced the gender wage gap.
shape the timing of bank deregulation across the states. As shown by Kroszner and Strahan (1999) , deregulation occurred later in states where potential losers from deregulation (small, monopolistic banks) were …nancially stronger and had a lot of political power. On the other hand, deregulation occurred earlier in states where potential winners of deregulation (small …rms) were relatively numerous. Most states deregulated geographic restrictions on banking between the mid-1970s and 1994, when the Riegle-Neal Act e¤ectively eliminated these restrictions.
Research also indicates that the forces driving bank deregulation were exogenous to competition in the non-…nancial sector and the racial wage gap. The timing of deregulation was not shaped by new …rm formation Strahan, 2002, Kerr and Nanda, 2009 ), the strength of labor unions (Black and Strahan, 2001 ), or the degree of earnings inequality (Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010) . Moreover, we show below that the racial wage gap does not explain the timing of bank deregulation.
Bank Deregulation and New Firm Entry in Non-Financial Sectors
Deregulation increased competition within the banking sector by making it possible for banks to (a) open branches across markets within a state and (b) open subsidiaries in other states. By increasing competition, deregulation improved bank performance. It reduced interest rates on loans, raised them on deposits, lowered overhead costs, and shrunk the proportion of bad loans (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998) . And, by enhancing the contestability of banking markets, deregulation expedited the development of better techniques for evaluating …rms (Hubbard and Palia, 1995) .
In boosting banking sector performance, bank deregulation reduced entry barriers facing …rms in non…nancial sectors. Improvements in banking-lower lending rates, better screening of borrowers, etc.-lowered …nancial barriers facing new …rms, intensifying competition in the overall economy. Black and Strahan (2002) …nd that deregulation helped entrepreneurs start new businesses, with the rate of new incorporations per capita in a state increasing by six percentage points following deregulation. Kerr and Nanda (2009) …nd that interstate deregulation increased the number of new start-ups by six percentage points and expanded the number of facilities of existing …rms by four percentage points. Kerr and Nanda (2009) also …nd a dramatic increase in both the entry and exit of …rms, suggesting that deregulation increased contestability throughout the economy.
Data

State-level data on deregulation and new …rm entry
The dates of interstate and intrastate bank deregulation are from Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Amel (2008) . Most states removed these geographic restrictions on banking between the mid-1970s and 1994, when they were eliminated by federal legislation. The Annex provides the deregulation dates.
Since the taste-based theory of discrimination focuses on the actual entry of new …rms, we use the rate of new incorporations to measure competition. Speci…cally, we use the log of new business incorporations per capita for each state over the period [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] , where the new incorporations data are from Black and Strahan (2002) , who obtain them from Dun and Bradstreet.
Generating Relative Residual Wages
CPS Samples for the Years 1977 to 2007
Data on wages and worker characteristics are from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS, March Supplements for the survey years 1977 to 2007). The CPS March Annual Demographic Supplements provide information on earnings, along with weeks and hours worked in the calendar year preceding the March survey so that the 1991 survey provides information on earnings in 1990. We start in Survey year 1977 because that is when the CPS reports information on each person's state of residence. To enhance comparability and connect our analyses to the literature, we restrict our sample to non-Hispanic white and black adult civilian males between the ages of 18 and 65 during the working year, and exclude persons living in group quarters or with missing data on relevant demographics. Our main wage sample further excludes the self-employed, persons in the military, agricultural, or private household sectors, persons with inconsistent reports on earnings, and individuals with allocated earnings.
We classify the adult population into six educational categories: (i) persons with 0-8 years of schooling completed; (ii) high school dropouts; (iii) high school graduates; (iv) some college; (v) college graduate; and (vi) advanced degree. Potential work experience is constructed as the maximum between zero and age minus years of schooling completed minus seven. In some speci…cations, we di¤erentiate workers by industry and occupation (144 industries and 262 occupations).
Wage rates are de…ned as real annual earnings divided by the product of weekly working hours and annual working weeks. We use the Consumer Price Index to de ‡ate earnings to 2000 dollars. Following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), workers with top coded earnings have their earnings set to 1.5 times the annual top-code. We trim outliers with wages below the 1st percentile and above the 97th percentile of the year-speci…c distribution of hourly earnings of full-time, full-year workers. This trimming virtually eliminates individuals with top-coded earnings. The results are robust to altering the de…nition of outliers. Consistent with previous research on bank deregulation, we drop Delaware and South Dakota due to large concentration of credit card banks in these states. The Annex provides more details on the sample.
Relative residual wages: Framework
We decompose the black-white wage di¤erential into "explained" and "residual" components, where the residual component is the "racial wage gap." In particular, assume that log hourly wages for a white individual i in state s at time t can be written as:
and log hourly wages for a black individual i in state s at time t can be written as:
where X ist represents individual characteristics associated with log hourly wages in state s in year t, including Mincerian characteristics, such as education and experience, and state-year …xed e¤ects. The parameters, 
where X st = X represents the mean wage di¤erential explained by the mean observed "skill" di¤erential between black and white workers X st , where these skill di¤erences are valued or "priced" using the returns that the average white worker gets for these skills ( W t ). The "residual" (racial wage gap) component, X B st t , which we designate as R Bst for simplicity, is that part of the mean black-white wage di¤erential unaccounted for by mean skill di¤erentials. The residual component represents the average wage gap between black and white workers with identical characteristics that emerges because of racial di¤erences in the returns to these characteristics ( t = B t W t ). Recall, these characteristics include standard, observable Mincerian traits as well as unobservable di¤erences in the average productive characteristics of black and white workers at the state-year level.
Thus, the racial wage gap (R Bst ) captures both the e¤ects of labor market discrimination and unobserved productivity di¤erences between black and white workers. A large literature focuses on identifying the role of these two sources. For example, Neal and Johnson (1996) attribute much of the unexplained gap in wages to di¤erences in cognitive abilities. In this paper we focus on evaluating the e¤ect of competition on labor market discrimination, i.e., the e¤ect of competition on racial di¤erences in the "prices" of skills. We use the di¤erential timing of bank deregulation across states and di¤erences in the taste for discrimination across states to identify the e¤ect of competition on labor market discrimination against black workers.
Relative residual wages: Estimation
First we estimate equation (1) separately for each year. Thus, we allow the Mincerian returns to observable skills W t to vary by year. This is crucial because of the the well-documented skill gap between black and white workers. Failure to account for time-varying returns to skills will lead to erroneous estimates of the dynamic pattern of relative wages, potentially biasing our assessments.
Then, employed with W t ; we compute residual wages (R ist ) for all workers, white and black:
By construction, R st for white workers equals zero in each state-year. For black workers the average relative residual wage, R Bst , can di¤er from zero. Since X ist e¤ectively includes state-year e¤ects (and state-industry-year e¤ects in some speci…cations), relative residual wages already account for state-year (or state-year-industry) e¤ects on white workers'wages, including the e¤ect of banking deregulation on the wage rates of white workers.
By controlling for these wage rate determinants, we account for the impact of bank deregulation on white workers' wages. If bank deregulation a¤ects wages but does not a¤ect labor market discrimination or the unobservable di¤erences in the mean productive characteristics of black and white workers in a state, then we should …nd no association between deregulation and blacks relative residual wages.
From a methodological perspective, an equivalent approach to this two-step procedure is to run a single wage regression that includes su¢ cient interaction terms based on race, year, state, and demographics to capture the properties mentioned above. This yields identical results, but the two-step approach is computationally faster.
Racial Bias Indexes
Throughout our analyses, we explicitly account for cross-state di¤erences in the taste for discrimination. This is both novel and essential to drawing accurate inferences because competition should have a larger impact on blacks' relative wages in states with a greater taste for discrimination (all other things equal).
We develop two types of racial bias indexes based on the accumulated stock of racial intermarriage in 1970. We use the 1970 Census to construct information on the rate of racial intermarriage in each state. The Census samples are the largest microdata set containing detailed marriage and demographic information. Our primary sample includes married whites and blacks between the ages of 18 and 65, and excludes couples in which at least one person is living in group quarter or has missing data on race, gender, state of residence, marital status and educational attainment.
The "simple" racial bias index equals the di¤erence between the rate of intermarriage that would exist if married people were randomly matched and the actual intermarriage rate. The random rate equals 2P (1 P ), where P is the proportion of blacks among the married population. Larger values of the simple racial bias index indicate that intermarriage occurs less in practice than if marriage pairings were random. We interpret larger values as (partially) re ‡ecting racial bias.
In the second type of index, we account for other factors that might induce the actual rate of intermarriage to deviate from the random rate. Intermarriage depends on the opportunities for interracial social contacts, so that the relative sizes of the blackwhite populations might independently a¤ect intermarriage (Blau, 1977) . Also, since the odds of interethnic unions increase with couples'educational attainment (Massey and Denton, 1987; Qian, 1997 ; Rubinstein and Brenner, 2009), we control for education and age. We estimate the following equation for married couples:
where I is equals one if couple i in state s is racially mixed and zero otherwise, H is and W is are vectors of age and education characteristics for the two spouses respectively, S s are state characteristics, is is the unexplained component of intermarriage, while b, c, and d are coe¢ cients. For state characteristics, we include the random intermarriage rate de…ned above along with the percentage of blacks among married couples. We experimented with numerous speci…cations, including and excluding the random intermarriage rate and the percentage of blacks, changing the speci…cation of education and age controls, and conditioning on metropolitan and urban locations. These combinations produce the same conclusions. From equation (5), we compute the intermarriage racial bias index for each state. Let s equal the average value of is across couples in state s. Recognizing that minf s g < 0, we compute the racial bias index as e T s = s + maxf s g, so that e T s equals zero for the state with the largest s . We interpret large values as signaling a stronger taste for discrimination. The Annex provides the value of the racial bias index, e T s ; for each state and the District of Columbia. The intermarriage racial bias index is positively correlated with survey-based measures of racial prejudice. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that the intermarriage racial bias index is positively related to three survey-based measures of racial prejudice used by Charles and Guryan (2008) in their study of relative wages and racial prejudices: (1) the fraction of whites supporting a law against interracial marriage, (2) the fraction of whites that would not vote for a black president, and (3) the fraction of whites supporting the right to segregate neighborhoods by race.
The intermarriage racial bias index is negatively correlated with blacks' relative wages. Table 1 (Panel B) shows that the intermarriage racial bias index is negatively associated with blacks'relative wage rates in the years prior to deregulation, even when controlling for the supply of blacks in the workforce, suggesting that the racial bias index captures cross-state di¤erences in the relative demand for black workers.
We also use the Charles and Guryan (2008) survey-based estimates of the degree of racial prejudice of the marginal …rm. As shown, states with above the median levels of this marginal racial prejudice indicator have signi…cantly lower blacks'relative wages. Nonetheless, the intermarriage racial bias index remains negatively and signi…cantly associated with blacks' relative wages even when controlling for the marginal racial prejudice indicator and the proportion of blacks in the workforce.
For the purposes of this paper, there are advantages to using the intermarriage racial bias index rather than survey-based measures of racial attitudes, though we draw consistent conclusions with either racial bias indicator. The intermarriage racial bias index is based on actual choices made prior to deregulation not survey responses made during the period of deregulation. Moreover, our empirical strategy requires that the measure of racial bias is invariant to bank deregulation and the resultant change in competition. If we di¤erentiate states based on a measure of racial bias that itself re ‡ects the e¤ects of deregulation on the relative demand and supply of black workers, this will confound our strategy of identifying the causal impact of product market competition on the relative demand for black workers. The racial attitude surveys, however, are conducted during the period of bank deregulation. Furthermore, unlike Charles and Guryan (2008), we do not want to measure the racial preferences of the marginal employer. This will incorporate in ‡uences of both the relative demand for and supply of black workers. Rather, theory predicts that an intensi…cation of competition will increase the relative demand for black workers and hence boost blacks' relative wages in states with a su¢ ciently high taste for discrimination, while holding the relative supply of black workers …xed. We test this.
In summary, we evaluate whether an exogenous lowering of entry barriers boosts the relative demand for black workers more in states with larger values of the racial bias indices. Measuring racial bias with error will bias the results against …nding statistically signi…cant results. We do not require that the racial bias measures are perfect; rather, we simply require that they provide information on racial prejudices across states.
Results
Preliminaries
Our empirical analysis rests on the assumption that the cross-state timing of bank deregulation was not a¤ected by the racial wage gap. Figure 1 shows that neither the level of the estimated wage gap before deregulation (Panel A) nor its rate of change prior to deregulation (Panel C) explains cross-state di¤erences in the timing of interstate bank deregulation. Panels B and D of Figure 1 con…rm these …ndings for the case of intrastate deregulation. The size of the "bubbles" in the …gures represent the size of the black workforce in each state, which corresponds to the weighting in the relative wage regressions below.
Our strategy also requires that bank deregulation increases the rate of new incorporations in the overall economy. In Table 2 , we show that both interstate bank deregulation and intrastate branch deregulation exert a strong, positive impact on the log of new incorporations per capita over time. In columns (1) (3), we use simple dummy variables that equal zero before a state deregulates and one afterwards. Interstate deregulation enters signi…cantly and positively, but intrastate does not, which is consistent with the …ndings in Black and Strahan (2002) .
The results in Table 2 emphasize that the positive impact of deregulation on the rate of new incorporations grows over time. In columns (4) (6), we include the number of years since deregulation and its quadratic. Interstate and Intrastate equal the number of years since interstate and intrastate bank deregulation respectively, and equal zero before deregulation. Both linear terms enter positively and signi…cantly, while the quadratic terms are negative, but the coe¢ cients are an order of magnitude smaller. The impact of each form of deregulation on new …rm entry grows over time, reaching a maximum about a decade after interstate deregulation, and over two decades after intrastate deregulation. Economically, the coe¢ cients in columns (4) and (5) indicate that …ve years after either inter-or intrastate deregulation the rate of new incorporations is about 10 percent greater than before deregulation. Furthermore, simultaneously deregulating inter-and intrastate restrictions boosts the rate of new incorporations by 18 percent after …ve years as shown in column (6) . Figure 2 more fully illustrates the positive, dynamic impact of both interstate and intrastate deregulation on the rate of new incorporations in state s in period t (N st ). In Figure 2 , we trace out the year-by-year relationship between both interstate and intrastate deregulation and the logarithm of new incorporations. We do this for two samples of states, those with above the median level of the racial bias index and those with below median levels. Speci…cally,we report estimated coe¢ cients from the following regression:
N st = + 1 Inter 9 +:::+ 18 Inter +9 + 1 Intra 9 +:::+ 18 Intra +9 + s + t +" st ; (6) where Inter j equals one for the j th year before interstate deregulation, and Inter +k equals one for the k th year after interstate deregulation, while Intra j equals one for the j th year before intrastate deregulation, and Intra +k equals one for the k th year after intrastate deregulation. These dummy variables equal zero in other years. We present results starting nine years before each form of bank deregulation and trace out the yearby-year dynamics of the relationship between deregulation and the wage gap until nine years after each type of bank deregulation. The year of deregulation is omitted and the regressions include state ( s ) and year ( t ) …xed e¤ects. After detrending the series, Figure 2 illustrates the level and trend of the logarithm of new incorporations following each type of bank deregulation relative to the level and trend before deregulation. Speci…cally, we compute the trend in the coe¢ cients on the dummy variables on bank deregulation prior to deregulation. We then detrend the entire series of estimated coe¢ cients based on the pre-deregulation trend. The resulting …gure illustrates the level and trend of the logarithm of new incorporations after bank deregulation relative to the patterns before deregulation. There are three critical observations from Figure 2 . First, interstate and intrastate bank deregulation boost the rate of new incorporations. This is crucial since we use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous intensi…cation of competition.
Second, the impact of bank deregulation on the rate of new incorporations is not immediate. The e¤ect of bank deregulation on the rate of new incorporations is still growing after …ve years. If bank deregulation a¤ects blacks'relative wages by increasing the rate of new incorporations, therefore, we should also …nd that the dynamic impact of deregulation on black's relative wages materializes over time.
Third, the positive impact of inter-and intrastate bank deregulation on the rate of new incorporations occurs in both states with above the median level of the racial bias index and in states with below the median level of the racial bias index, though the marginal impact of intrastate deregulation on the rate of new incorporations in low racial bias states is less pronounced than in high racial bias states. Though the impact of bank deregulation on new incorporations does not have to be identical in high and low racial bias states, our empirical strategy requires that deregulation boosts the rate of new incorporations in both high and low racial bias states because we propose to evaluate whether the marginal impact of an exogenous increase in competition is greater in high racial bias states.
Bank Deregulation and Blacks'Relative Wages
Reduced Form Analyses of Bank Deregulation
We next assess the reduced form impact of Interstate and Intrastate on the relative wage rates of black workers R ist . For each form of deregulation, we present three speci…cations. First, blacks' relative wages are regressed on bank deregulation using the full sample. Second, we add an interaction term of deregulation and the racial bias dummy for each state, which equals one if the value of the racial bias index is greater than or equal to the sample median and zero otherwise. As suggested by theory, the impact of competition-enhancing bank deregulation on blacks' relative wages should be greater in more racially biased states. Third, rather than include an interaction term, we split the sample by the median value of the racial bias index, which allows the coe¢ cients on state and year …xed e¤ects to di¤er across the two subsamples. Throughout the analyses, we include state and year …xed e¤ects. Table 3 shows that bank deregulation has a large, signi…cant impact on the relative wage rates of black workers in states with su¢ ciently high values of the racial bias index. In the regressions including the interaction of deregulation with the racial bias dummy, the impact of deregulation on blacks'relative wages is increasing in the state's racial bias index. The results hold for both inter-and intrastate bank deregulation. When splitting the sample between high and low racial bias states, the results indicate that a drop in entry barriers triggers a bigger increase in the relative demand for black workers in more racially biased economies.
Furthermore, by splitting the sample between high and low racial bias states, we employ a quasi-triple di¤erence speci…cation. In particular, there might be concerns that even though bank deregulation di¤ers in its timing across states, there might be a confounding factor that reduces racial discrimination and is coincident with the state-speci…c timing of bank deregulation. By showing that bank deregulation only increases blacks'relative wages in high racial bias states as predicted by theory, this reduces the possibility that an unobserved state-year e¤ect is driving the results, and it is fully consistent with the view that intensi…ed competition reduces the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor market outcomes.
The estimated reduction in the racial wage gap from bank deregulation is economically meaningful. Consider column (4) of Table 3 , which provides the regression results for states with above the median value of the racial bias index. Among these states, deregulation boosts the wage rates of black workers by 6 percentage points more than their white counterparts after …ve years (6 = 0:012 5 100). Since the average racial wage gap in these high-bias states was 21 percent in 1976, the results suggest that interstate deregulation eliminates almost one-third of the initial racial wage gap. The results are virtually identical when using Intrastate, as shown in column (8).
Dynamic Analysis of the E¤ect of Bank Deregulation
We next illustrate the dynamic relation between bank deregulation and the relative wages of blacks. In Figure 3 , we trace out the year-by-year relationship between deregulation and the racial wage gap by following structure as we used to examine the dynamic relation between deregulation and new incorporations (Cf. equation (6) and Figure 2 ). The year of deregulation is omitted and the regressions include state and year …xed e¤ects.
In examining the dynamic impact of deregulation on the racial wage gap, we use two samples of states. In Panel A of Figure 3 , the subsample includes states with above the median values of the racial bias index. Panel B reports the dynamic relation between the relative wage rates of black workers and bank deregulation for the subsample of states with below the median values. The dashed line reports the estimated coe¢ -cients on the interstate deregulation dummy variables, while the solid line provides the estimated coe¢ cients on the intrastate deregulation dummy variables.
Three crucial messages emerge from Figure 3 . First, the impact of both interstate and intrastate bank deregulation on blacks' relative wages is much greater in states where the racial bias index is above the median than in states with lower values of the racial bias index. For example, the impact of interstate bank deregulation on blacks' relative wages rises over time in states with high values of the racial bias index, while interstate bank deregulation has virtually no e¤ect on relative wage rates in states with low values of the racial bias index. Second, there is no evidence that trends or innovations in the wage gap precede either interstate or intrastate bank deregulation. Rather, blacks'relative wages rise after bank deregulation for an extensive period in states with high values of the racial bias index. Third, the impact of deregulation on black's relative wages grows over time. This is consistent with the dynamics of the relationship between deregulation and the rate of new incorporation documented in Figure 2 and Table 2 .
While demonstrating the powerful impact of bank deregulation on the racial wage gap, these results do not provide direct evidence on the underlying causal mechanisms. We now examine the relationship between the rate of new incorporations and blacks' relative wages to assess whether, and under which conditions, an exogenous increase in the rate of new incorporations reduces the black-white wage gap.
New Firm Entry and Blacks'Relative Wages
Reduced Form Analyses of New Firms Entry
In examining the relationship between competition and the racial wage gap, we begin with reduced form OLS regressions. In Table 4 , the dependent variable is blacks' relative wages R ist . The key regressor is the log of new incorporations per capita. The estimation is conducted on the full sample, and we also split the sample into states with below and above the median level of the racial bias index. In Panel A, we use the benchmark measure of blacks'relative wages, which is computed while conditioning on the standard Mincerian characteristics, education and potential work experience. In Panel B, we use an alternative measure of blacks'relative wages that also conditions on occupation, as discussed above.
There is a strong, positive association between the rate of new incorporations and the relative wages of black workers in states with above the median values of the racial bias index (column 3). The OLS estimates indicate that ten percent increase in the rate of new incorporations is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in blacks'relative wages in high racial bias states. In contrast, there is no relationship between the wage gap and our proxy for competition in states with low values of the racial bias index (column 2). These results hold both when using the benchmark, Mincerian measure of blacks'relative wages (Panel A) and also when conditioning on occupation (Panel B).
2SLS Analyses of New Firm Entry
The …nal six columns of Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 report 2SLS estimates, where two di¤erent sets of instrumental variables are used to identify changes in the rate of new incorporations. First, the "linear" instruments simply include Interstate and Intrastate. Second, the "Non-Parametric" instruments included dummy variables for each year before and after both interstate and intrastate deregulation. These instruments are drawn from the analyses reported above in Table 2 and Figure 3 . Furthermore, in reported robustness tests, we …nd that using Interstate and Intrastate plus their quadratic terms as instruments produces similar results.
As shown, the instrumental variables pass the validity tests. They signi…cantly explain new incorporations as shown by the F-test of the excluded instruments. Furthermore, the instruments pass the test of the over-identifying restrictions (OIR test), meaning that the hypothesis that the instruments only a¤ect blacks' relative wages through their e¤ect on new incorporations is not rejected. In unreported robustness tests, we also show that the results are not driven by states in which deregulation failed to induce an increase in new …rm entry which would run counter to theory and our identi…cation strategy. Thus, we run the …rst-stage regression while omitting each state one-at-a-time. We then …nd which states are " ‡attening" the estimated relationship between new …rm entry and deregulation in the …rst stage. When we eliminate these states, the results strengthen. This robustness test suggests that the e¤ects of deregulation on racial discrimination are driven by states in which the "treatment" is a¤ecting new …rm entry, not through some spurious channel.
The exogenous increase in the rate of new incorporations dramatically boosted the wage rates of black workers relative to their white counterparts in states with above the median values of the racial bias index. As reported in columns (6) and (9) of both Panels A and B, an acceleration of the rate of new incorporations increased blacks' relative wages in high racial bias states. In contrast, the results in columns (5) and (8) indicate that a faster rate of new incorporations did not increase blacks'relative wages in states with below the median values of the racial bias index.
The economic impact the rate of new incorporations on blacks' relative wages is large in states with above the median level of the racial bias index. With either set of instrumental variables, the estimates indicate that a ten percent acceleration in the rate of new incorporations increases blacks'relative wages by about 2.5 percent in high racial bias states. The 2SLS parameter estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. This is consistent with the reverse causality argument made above. Speci…cally, if …rms are attracted to states where blacks'relative wages are particularly low, OLS will underestimate the impact of a lowering of entry barriers on blacks'relative wages.Combining these results with those in Figure 2 , the results suggest that bank deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations by over 20% after …ve years in high racial bias states, which in turn increased blacks' relative wages by about …ve percent in these same states. These estimates indicate that by increasing competition, bank deregulation boosted blacks' relative wages by one-quarter of the initial racial wage gap in these states, which equaled, on average, 20 percent in the years before bank deregulation.
New Firm Entry and Blacks'Relative Wages: Sensitivity Analyses
The results are robust to using either the Charles and Guryan (2008) measure of racial prejudices (CG) or the intermarriage racial bias index (LLR) to categorize states as high-or low-racial bias states. Table 5 presents the OLS and 2SLS analyses of the relation between the racial wage gap and the rate of new incorporations. We use the linear instrument set and compute blacks'relative wages conditional on standard Mincerian traits and occupation. We use a common sample of states that is slightly smaller than in Table 4 because the CG measure is unavailable for Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, and New Mexico.
The strong positive impact of the rate of new incorporations on blacks' relative wages is robust to using the CG racial prejudice indicator to classify states. In states with above the median values of the two racial bias indicators, the log of new incorporations per capita is positively associated with blacks'relative wages. Figure 4 shows that the results are robust to considering the full range of possible combinations of (1) estimation strategy (OLS and 2SLS), (2) method for computing blacks'relative wages (either conditioning on standard Mincerian controls (R) or also conditioning on occupation (Ro)), (3) method for categorizing states by taste for discrimination (LLR or CG), and (4) using linear or non-parametric instrumental variables (Linear or N on param:). Figure 4 plots each point estimate along with its 95% con…dence interval. As shown, the results are robust. In terms of the instrumental variable results, there is only one speci…cation in which the rate of new incorporation does not enter positively and signi…cantly at the …ve percent level, and instead enters with a p-value of (0:10). This exception involves using the CG indicator to de…ne racial attitudes, and we have already discussed the advantages, in the context of our particular study, of using the intermarriage racial bias measure (LLR).
Robustness Checks
In this section, we address concerns about several factors that could confound our ability to draw accurate inferences about the impact of bank deregulation that lowers entry barriers on racial wage discrimination. Some of these factors work against the reported …ndings, leading us to underestimate the bene…cial e¤ects of bank deregulation and the rate of new incorporations on blacks'relative wages. In these cases, we simply discuss our robustness tests without presenting tables. Other factors either play a central role in Becker's (1957) theory or potentially lead us to overestimate the impact of competition on racial discrimination. In these cases, we present correspondingly more information.
Racial Discrimination or the Poor
Since bank deregulation exerts a disproportionately positive impact on the poor and blacks are on average comparatively poor (Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010), the current paper's analyses could re ‡ect this income distributional e¤ect, rather than the impact of bank deregulation and competition on blacks in particular.
Three observations, however, suggest that this is not the case. First, bank deregulation and the rate of new incorporations boosted blacks'relative wages in states with a high degree of racial bias. This is di¢ cult to reconcile with the view that our results simply re ‡ect a tightening of the distribution of income. Second, the results hold when computing relative wages conditional on occupation and industry. Thus, our …ndings indicate that even within low-paying (and high-paying) occupations and industries, blacks'relative wages rose with competition.
Third, and most directly, we perform a rank analysis and compare the change in blacks'relative wages with those of comparable whites across the full distribution of relative wage rates. If deregulation is simply helping the poor, we should not see that blacks converge toward whites at each point in the wage distribution.
The results show that bank deregulation, and the accompanying boost in the log of new incorporations per capita, disproportionately helped black workers across the full distribution of wages. Figure 5 shows the rank plot for the high racial bias states, and for the sample of states with below the median level of the racial bias index. The solid and dashed lines represent the location of blacks within the conditional log hourly wage distribution of whites before and after deregulation respectively. The median black among the high racial bias states, for example, corresponds to the 28 th percentile white worker prior to deregulation and the 32 nd percentile white work after deregulation. The median black, therefore, gained four ranks in the white wage distribution as a result of deregulation, but only in high racial bias states. Consistent with the earlier results, there is little change in relative wage rates in the low racial bias states. These results suggest that deregulation exerted a particularly pronounced e¤ect on black workers.
Blacks'Relative Wages Within Industries
Bank deregulation and its impact on the rate of new incorporations might induce a shift of black workers to better paying industries, rather than an increase in blacks'relative wages within industries. To assess whether the shift of black workers to higher-paying industries accounts for the increase in blacks'relative wages, we evaluate the impact of an increase in the rate of new incorporations on blacks'relative wages, where we not only compute blacks'relative wages by conditioning on education, potential experience, and occupation, but also by conditioning on industry. Thus, we compare the wages of black workers with the same observable traits as their white counterparts who are working in the same industry and the same occupation.
The results in Table 6 suggest that the intensi…cation of competition boosted blacks' wages relative to comparable white workers within the same industry and occupation. Increased racial integration in the workplace does not fully account for the increase in blacks'relative wages following the boost in the rate of new incorporations. Both results -the increase in blacks'relative wages and the increase in racial integration in the workplace -are consistent with the taste-based view of racial discrimination.
Relative Hours Worked
We were concerned that blacks'relative wages could also rise if deregulation induced the labor supply curve of black males to shift leftward. If this occurs, the working hours of blacks could actually fall after deregulation relative to those of whites. Table 7 reports the e¤ects of bank deregulation and the log of new incorporations per capita on the relative working hours of blacks in high racial bias states using two approaches. We examine high racial bias states because this is where the rate of new incorporations increased blacks'relative wages. In the …rst approach, we trace the impact of bank deregulation, through the rate of new incorporations, to blacks'relative wages. We then examine the impact of these projected relative wages on blacks'relative annual hours worked. If an outward shift in the demand curve is causing the increase in blacks'relative wages, then we expect to …nd a positive coe¢ cient on blacks'relative wages in the relative working hours regression.
In the second approach, we examine the impact of the log of new incorporations per capita on the relative working hours of blacks without tracing the e¤ect through relative wages. Speci…cally, we reproduce the 2SLS analyses in Table 4 except that the dependent variable is the di¤erence between the actual number of hours worked of each black worker and the projected annual hours worked of a white worker with identical traits. The di¤erence between the actual and projected hours worked re ‡ects the racial gap in hours. We use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous increase in new incorporations and assess the impact on this gap in working hours.
To compute relative working hours, we …rst estimate a labor supply equation every year on a sample of white males, while conditioning on state …xed e¤ects and the same Mincerian characteristics used in the wage equation. Then, we use the resulting coef…cient estimates to calculate the predicted number of hours worked of a white worker with each black worker's characteristics. Finally, we compute the relative working hours of each black worker as the di¤erence between his actual and predicted working hours.
Since there is a meaningful kink in the labor supply curve between working and not working, we use both OLS and Tobit speci…cations and also examine the subsample of blacks with positive working hours. We use a standard bootstrapping procedure to correct the standard errors since the regressors are estimated.
We …nd that bank deregulation that increased the rate of new incorporations and boosted blacks'relative wages also increased the relative working hours of blacks. The evidence suggests that bank deregulation increased the relative demand for black workers. As shown, the impact is particularly pronounced among workers. This suggests that while deregulation increased the relative demand for black workers, bank deregulation did not signi…cantly attract new black workers into the workforce. Most important given the focus of this paper, the Table 7 results clearly demonstrate that bank deregulation and competition did not shift black's labor supply curve to the left.
Selection, Migration, and Self-Employment
We were concerned that changes in the skill composition of black males in the economy could a¤ect our evaluation of blacks' relative wages. Consequently, we calculate the projected wage rates for all working age (non-institutionalized) blacks in each state, whether they are working or not. We do this using the estimated returns to observable traits from equation (4) and using the actual traits of each black male. In this way, we compute the value of observable traits of all black males. Then, we evaluate the impact of bank deregulation on the composition of skills in the workforce. Table 8 provides regression results of the projected wage rates of all relevant black males on a dummy variable if the person works, Interstate, and the interaction between Interstate and the dummy variable for working or not, as well as state and year …xed e¤ects. There are similar regressions for Intrastate. The summation of the coe¢ cients on Interstate and the interaction term provide information on whether the average value of the traits of workers changes after deregulation. The coe¢ cient on Interstate provides information on the change in the average value of the traits of individuals who are not working following deregulation.
Deregulation did not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the average value of the traits of black workers. There is no evidence that bank deregulation substantively a¤ected the skill composition of black workers. To the extent that observable traits are correlated with unobservable characteristics, these results further imply that the composition of unobservable traits did not change much following bank deregulation. Deregulation could also a¤ect migration across states. To assess this, we estimate the e¤ect of deregulation on the fraction of black males within states. We …nd that the share of black males within states increased slightly after deregulation. This is consistent with a situation in which deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations, reduced the racial wage gap, and attracted blacks from other states. Yet, as shown in Table 8 , the net compositional changes of blacks in the economy due to deregulation did not have much of an e¤ect on the skill composition of working blacks. There is no indication that migration leads us to overstate the bene…cial e¤ects of deregulation.
Similarly, the boost in blacks'relative wages could attract black males with comparatively low unobserved skills into the labor force, leading us to underestimate the degree to which the rate of new incorporations reduces racial wage di¤erentials. A quantile regression at the median helps in assessing the importance of this potential bias by putting less weight on entrants of black workers with low unobserved skills.
We …nd no evidence that selection based on unobservables is causing us to underestimate the true e¤ect of the rate of new incorporations. While the log of new incorporations per capita increases the relative demand for black workers, the number of new black males pulled into the labor force is relatively small, such that the median regression yields virtually identical results to the OLS coe¢ cient estimates.
Swimming Upstream
Biases could arise from changes in the "prices" of unobserved skills. Although national trends in returns to unobserved skills will not a¤ect our results because we control for year …xed e¤ects, the intensi…cation of competition when a state deregulates could increase returns to unobservable traits. If the average white worker has more of these unobserved traits than the average black worker, the average wage rate of whites will rise relative to that of blacks. This e¤ect will cause the estimated value of blacks' relative wages to fall, even though racial discrimination is not rising.
Under these conditions, we will underestimate the true, positive e¤ect of deregulation on the relative wages of blacks. This is sometimes called "swimming upstream" (Juhn Murphy and Pierce, 1991; Blau and Kahn, 1997; Blau and Kahn, 2000; and Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008) . To assess the importance of swimming upstream, we follow the literature and use quantile regressions. The goal is to compare black and white workers that are more similar in unobserved skills than when using OLS, which compares averages from both groups.
In unreported regressions, we con…rm the existence of swimming upstream, suggesting that we are underestimating the bene…cial e¤ects of bank deregulation on blacks' relative wages when using OLS. The median regressions produce similar coe¢ cient estimates to those from OLS. Moreover, in moving from lower quantiles to higher quantiles, we …nd that deregulation reduced a larger proportion of the racial wage gap. Under the assumption that the average white has more unobserved skills than the average black, these …ndings are consistent with the view that the racial wage gap closed more among white and black workers with comparable unobserved skills.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the relationship between bank deregulation and racial inequality in America. As Becker (1957) argued, taste-based discrimination by employers can produce an equilibrium gap between the wages of identical black and white workers. He further stressed that lowering barriers to the entry of new …rms could erode the racial wage gap by reducing the impact of racial prejudices on the relative demand for black workers. A central implication of the taste-based discrimination theory is that lowering entry barriers will reduce the black-white wage di¤erential only in economies where employers have a su¢ ciently strong "taste for discrimination."
We …nd that bank deregulation across the U.S. states boosted blacks'relative wages by lowering barriers to the entry of new …rms but only in states with a high degree of racial bias. In reduced form speci…cations, bank deregulation that lowered entry barriers facing non…nancial …rms reduced the racial wage gap. In 2SLS, we use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous lowering of entry barriers. We …nd that the resultant increase in new incorporations eliminated more than one-…fth of the preexisting black-white wage di¤erential in high racial bias states over a …ve-year period.
The paper emphasizes the powerful role of …nance in shaping the economic opportunities of an historically oppressed group in the United States. Banking sector policies that facilitated competition materially enhanced blacks'relative wages. Our research shows that these improvements materialized through indirect channels: bank deregulation enhanced the functioning of labor markets throughout the economy, reducing racial inequality and boosting the economic opportunities of African Americans. Figure A we consider years prior to interstate deregulation. In Figure  B we consider years prior to intrastate deregulation. Figures C and D plot the year of bank deregulation against the change in the black-white wage differential prior to deregulation. In Figure C we consider years prior to interstate deregulation. In Figure D we consider years prior to intrastate deregulation. All statistics are weighted by the number of black workers. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) . NOTE -The figures plot the impact of interstate and intrastate bank deregulations on log new corporations per capita. The upper figure is for states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figure is for state with racial bias index below the median. We consider an 18 years window spanning from 9 years before deregulations until 9 years after deregulations. The solid lines represent the impact of intrastate deregulation on log new per capita. The dashed lines represent the impact of interstate deregulation on log new corporations per capita. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following regression: Yst = α + β1Intra-9 + γ1Inter-9 + β2Intra-8 + γ2Inter-8 + … + β18Intra+9 + γ18Inter+9 + δs + δt + εst Yst is log new corporations per capita in state s and year t. Intra-j equals one for states in the j th year before intrastate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. Intra+k equals one for states in the k th year after intrastate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. Similarly, Inter-j equals one in states in the j th year before interstate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. Inter+k equals one in states in the k th year after interstate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. δs and δt are state and year fixed effects, respectively. We exclude the year of intrastate and interstate deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on log new corporations per capita relative to the corresponding year of deregulation. We de-trend the coefficients by prior trends and normalize their average prior to deregulation to be zero. The estimates are weighted by the number of black workers. The D's equal zero, except as follows: D-j equals one for states in the j th year before deregulation, while D+j equals one for states in the j th year after deregulation. We exclude the year of deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on the relative wage rates of blacks relative to the year of deregulation. We de-trend the coefficients by prior trends and normalize their average prior to deregulation to be zero. The estimates are weighted by the number of black workers. THE IMPACT OF LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS PER CAPITA ON THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS  DIFFERENT OLS AND 2SLS SPECIFICATIONS  (DASHED LINES REPRESENT 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) NOTE -The circles represent the estimated impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wages of blacks. The dashed lines represent the corresponding 95% confidence intervals, adjusted for state and year clustering. The estimated coefficients and the confidence intervals are from twelve different specifications. The notation in the specifications is as follows: OLS -Ordinary Least Squares; 2SLS Linear -Two-Stage Least Squares with Interstate and Intrastate entering linearly; 2SLS Non-param -Two-Stage Least Squares with Interstate and Intrastate entering non-parametrically; R -relative wages of blacks, where the relative wages are conditional on years of completed education and quartic in potential experience; Ro -relative wages of blacks, where the relative wages are conditional on years of completed education, a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects; LLR -states with racial bias index above the median; CG -states with marginal racial prejudice (From Charles and Guryan, 2008) above the median. The different specifications are: (1) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median racial bias index, (2) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median racial bias index, (3) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (4) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (5) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median racial bias index, (6) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median racial bias index, (7) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (8) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (9) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median racial bias index, (10) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median racial bias index, (11) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (12) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice. Measures of marginal racial prejudice are obtained from Charles and Guryan (2008) . All estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Percentage point change in relative wages of blacks
Figure 5 THE LOCATION OF BLACKS IN THE WHITE WAGE DISTRIBUTION BEFORE AND AFTER DEREGULATION
NOTE -The figures provide rank analyses and compare the change in black workers' relative wages with those of comparable whites across the full distribution of wage rates, before and after bank deregulation. The results in the plots were obtained using the following procedure: First, we calculate residuals for black and white workers from equation (7) . We keep 100 black workers, each corresponding to a different percentile of black workers' relative log hourly wage distribution. Next, we calculate their position in the white workers' log hourly wage distribution. We repeat this procedure before (solid line) and after (dashed line) inter-and intrastate deregulations. The upper figures refer to states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figures refer to states with racial bias index below the median. We use sampling weights in all estimations. ) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. In column (1), the regressor is an indicator which equals one if the racial bias index above the median and zero otherwise. In column (2) the regressor is an indicator which equals one if the marginal racial prejudice above the median and zero otherwise. The marginal racial prejudice index is the p th percentile of the distribution of an aggregate index of racial prejudice, where p is the percentile of workforce that is black. The marginal racial prejudice index is taken from Charles and Guryan (2008) . Column (3) includes simultaneously the regressors from columns (1) and (2) . In column (4) we also control for an indicator which equals one if the proportion of blacks in the workforce in 1970 is above 10%. The regressions include black workers prior to interstate and intrastate bank deregulation, so that the reported number of observations equals 10,076. All regressions include year fixed effects. We do not include state fixed effects because the regressors are fixed for each state and do not change over time. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level and appear in parentheses; pvalues are in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Table 2 . In columns (1)-(4), "years since deregulation" stands for years since interstate deregulation; in columns (5)- (8), "years since deregulation" stands for years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (2) and (6), years since deregulation is interacted with an indicator which equals one if the racial bias index is above the median and zero otherwise. In columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) we include the entire sample. In columns (3) and (7) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (4) and (8) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. The average initial racial wage gap is 17% for all states, 15% for states with a racial bias index below the median, and 21% for states with a racial bias index above the median. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Table 2 . The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (4) , and (7) we include the entire sample. In columns (2), (5), and (8) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (3), (6) , and (9) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. Columns (1)- (3) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (4)- (9) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. In columns (4)-(6), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by years since interstate deregulation and years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (7)- (9), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. The F-test of excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. "CG" stands for the marginal racial prejudice which is obtained from Charles and Guryan (2008) . In columns (1) and (5) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (3) and (7) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. In columns (2) and (6) we include only states with marginal racial prejudice below the median. In columns (4) and (8) Table 2 . The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (4), and (7) we include the entire sample. In columns (2), (5), and (8) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (3), (6) , and (9) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. Columns (1)-(3) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (4)-(9) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. In columns (4)-(6), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by years since interstate deregulation and years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (7)-(9), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. The F-test of excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. NOTE -The dependent variable is the predicted relative wages of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. The reported number of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2 . The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1) and (2) we include the entire sample. In columns (3) and (4) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (5) and (6) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. NOTE -The racial bias index is based on inter-racial marriage data obtained from the 1970 Census of Population. The sample includes married whites and blacks between that ages of 18 to 65, and excludes couples in which at least one person is living in group quarters or has missing data on race, gender, state of residence, marital status, or educational attainment. The racial bias index is based on the difference between the estimated rate of inter-racial marriage in 1970, where the estimation is based on each state's racial composition along with each individual's education and age characteristics, and the actual rate of inter-racial marriage. Larger values of the racial bias index signify that the actual rate of inter-racial marriage is correspondingly smaller than the estimated rate.
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